Must interesting things be pleasant? A test of competing appraisal structures. by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Silvia, Paul
Must Interesting Things be Pleasant? A Test of Competing Appraisal Structures

 
 
By: Samuel A. Turner Jr. and Paul J. Silvia 
 
Turner, S. A., Jr., & Silvia, P. J. (2006). Must interesting things be pleasant? A test of competing appraisal  
 structures. Emotion, 6, 670-674. 
 
Made available courtesy of American Psychological Association: 
http://www.apa.org/journals/emo/description.html 
 
This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of 
record. 
 
***Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
 
Abstract: 
Appraisal theories have emerged as a powerful perspective on the elicitation and differentiation of emotional 
experience (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Given the general acceptance of the appraisal approach, a central task 
for modern appraisal research is to refine and reconcile the predictions made by appraisal models. The 
agreement among different appraisal theories is substantial, yet there are cases in which different theories make 
inconsistent predictions. To date, few studies have directly compared the competing predictions made by 
different appraisal theories (see Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990). The present research examines two 
competing appraisal models of the emotion of interest, an emotion associated with curiosity, exploration, and 
knowledge-seeking (Izard, 1977; Silvia, 2005c, Silvia, 2006; Tomkins, 1962). Smith and Ellsworth (1985) 
suggest that interest requires an appraisal of high pleasantness (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a, Ellsworth & Smith, 
1988b). A recent appraisal model of interest (Silvia, 2005a, Silvia, 2005c), however, suggests that pleasantness 
is peripheral to interest—people can be interested in disturbing, unpleasant events. The present research uses in 
vivo methods (rather than scenario or retrospective methods) to test these competing appraisal structures. 
 
Article: 
The Emotion of Interest  
Interest has been a controversial emotion. Some emotion theories view interest as an important emotion that is 
central to curiosity, learning, and human development (e.g., Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962). Other theories, in 
contrast, do not view interest as an emotion (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). If emotions 
are viewed as organized syndromes of components, such as experiential, expressive, cognitive, physiological, 
and motivational components (Scherer, 2001), then interest appears to qualify as an emotion (see Silvia, 2006, 
chap. 1, for a review). Interest has a reliable expressive component in both infants (Langsdorf, Izard, Rayias, & 
Hembree, 1983) and adults (Reeve, 1993). Physiological markers of heightened engagement predict self-
reported interest and behavioral measures of interest (Evans & Day, 1971; Langsdorf et al., 1983; Libby, Lacey, 
& Lacey, 1973). Interest's motivational components have been widely studied. Research in text processing, for 
example, shows that interest affects what people choose to read, promotes the use of deep-level processing 
strategies, and enhances comprehension of the text (see Silvia, 2006, chap. 3). Finally, self-reported interest, 
physiological engagement, expressive markers of interest, and behavioral measures of exploration converge 
(e.g., Langsdorf et al., 1983; Reeve, 1993; see Silvia, 2006, chap. 1). Thus, it seems reasonable to view interest 
as an emotion, perhaps as part of a family of ―epistemology-based emotions‖ (Keltner & Shiota, 2003). 
 
Appraisal Models of Interest  
Smith and Ellsworth's Model 
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Smith and Ellsworth (1985) were the first researchers to propose an appraisal structure for interest. They asked 
people to remember past emotions, one at a time, and then to rate the experience on scales designed to tap 
appraisal components. Interest involved three components: high pleasantness, high attentional activity, and 
moderate certainty. In a subsequent retrospective study of positive emotions, Ellsworth and Smith (1988b) again 
found that high pleasantness and high attentional activity differentiated interest from other positive emotions. 
Unlike the prior study, however, high effort predicted interest and the effect of certainty didn't replicate. In their 
retrospective study devoted to negative emotions (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a), a similar appraisal structure 
emerged. High pleasantness and high attentional activity again predicted interest. Unlike the past two studies, 
this study found that appraisals of uncertainty and importance predicted interest. 
 
Viewed collectively, these three studies suggest that interest's core appraisal structure consists of high 
pleasantness and high attentional activity. Unambiguous support for these two components appeared in all three 
studies. Appraised importance (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a) and appraised effort (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988b) 
each appeared in one of the three studies, and high certainty had a positive effect in one study (Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985), a negative effect in another (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988a), and no effect in a third (Ellsworth & 
Smith, 1988b). It thus seems reasonable, based on the entire program of research, to view pleasantness and 
attentional activity as interest's appraisal components in the Ellsworth and Smith model. 
 
Silvia's Model 
An alternative appraisal structure of interest was proposed by Silvia (2005b). Rooted in the multilevel 
sequential-check theory of appraisal (Scherer, 2001), this model proposes that interest involves an appraisal of 
novelty–complexity (whether an event is new, uncertain, complex, or contradictory) followed by an appraisal of 
coping potential (the ability to understand the new, complex thing). Thus far, seven direct tests have strongly 
supported this appraisal structure (Silvia, 2006a, Silvia, 2005a, Silvia, 2005c; for reviews, see Silvia, 2005b, 
Silvia, 2006b). Appraisals of novelty–complexity and coping potential strongly predict interest. These effects 
appear for manipulated and measured appraisals, for self-report and behavioral measures of interest, for several 
kinds of interesting stimuli (random polygons, poetry, experimental visual art), and for between-person and 
within-person levels of analysis (Silvia, 2005a). It is worth noting that all of these experiments involved in vivo 
manipulation and assessment of interest. People were exposed to potentially interesting events; their appraisals 
were measured or manipulated; and their momentary experience of interest was measured. In no instance were 
people asked to retrospectively recall a past episode of intense interest or an intense positive emotion and then 
rate that experience on an extensive set of emotion and appraisal scales. 
 
By omitting pleasantness, Silvia's appraisal model assumes that events needn't be appraised as pleasant to be 
interesting. This reasoning is based on past theories of interest and past experimental research. Tomkins (1962) 
contended that interest and enjoyment had different adaptive functions. Interest motivates novelty-seeking and 
exploration, whereas enjoyment motivates attachments to familiar events that caused enjoyment in the past. 
Tomkins noted that these functions could conflict, such as when one has to choose between a new restaurant 
and a favorite restaurant. The purpose of novelty-seeking is to build knowledge and skills (White, 1959) and 
trying new things often leads to negative emotions due to uncertainty, threat, or disappointment. If interest 
required pleasantness, interest's novelty-seeking function would be undermined. Tomkins's functional 
distinction between interest and enjoyment is supported by people's fascination with disgusting, morbid, and 
macabre events (e.g., Rawlings, 2003). Although distressing and violent events are unpleasant, interest enables 
people to gain information about such events and thus to possibly forestall them. 
 
Furthermore, a large literature shows that interest and enjoyment have different causes (for a review, see Silvia, 
2006, chap. 1). Dozens of experiments in the Berlyne (Berlyne, 1971,Berlyne, 1974) tradition of experimental 
aesthetics explored relations between interest and enjoyment. This research, which used diverse stimulus 
materials, dependent measures, and samples, commonly found dissociations between interest and enjoyment. In 
particular, the class of novelty–complexity variables (labeled collative variables by Berlyne) increases interest 
but decreases enjoyment (for an early review, see Berlyne, 1971, pp. 213–220). Moreover, ratings of interest 
and enjoyment differentially predict behavioral measures of exploration and physiological markers of task 
engagement (e.g., Evans & Day, 1971; Libby et al., 1973). Nearly all of this research preceded the development 
of appraisal models of interest, so it didn't use appraisal concepts to explain the relationships (see Silvia, 
2005b). Nevertheless, the replicated dissociations between interest and pleasantness deserve attention from 
modern appraisal researchers, particularly because (a) most of the experiments manipulated appraisal 
components and (b) none of the experiments involved retrospective reports of past emotional states. 
 
The Present Research  
In the present research, we tested the competing appraisal predictions. Participants viewed a series of classical 
paintings; some of the paintings were disturbing and others were calming. For each picture, participants 
provided reports of emotions and appraisals (interest, pleasantness, novelty–complexity, coping potential, and 
disturbingness). This design enables a series of analyses that triangulate on whether or not pleasantness is 
central to interest. First, we tested whether interest and pleasantness were highly correlated. Smith and 
Ellsworth would predict a strong correlation, whereas we would not. Second, we explored whether interest and 
pleasantness had similar antecedent appraisals (e.g., whether novelty–complexity has similar effects on interest 
and pleasantness). Smith and Ellsworth would predict similar antecedents given the presumed high correlation 
between interest and pleasantness, whereas we would predict dissociations (i.e., novelty–complexity should 
have opposite effects on interest and pleasantness, as in past research). Finally, we examined how interest and 
pleasantness relate to the paintings' level of disturbingness. Smith and Ellsworth would predict that disturbing 
paintings would be less interesting given the necessity of pleasantness for interest, whereas we would expect 
disturbing paintings to be more interesting. 
 
Method  
Participants and Design 
A total of 83 students—68 women, 14 men, and 1 unspecified—enrolled in General Psychology at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro participated and received credit toward a research option. Six 
people were excluded because they were not native English speakers or because of substantial missing data, 
leaving a final sample of 77 (64 women, 13 men). 
 
Procedure 
Participants were run in groups of up to eight at a time in a laboratory with individual desks. Everyone faced the 
same direction, and the participants couldn't see each other's faces. The experimenter explained that the study 
was about people's emotions, thoughts, and impressions in response to different kinds of visual art. People 
received a booklet of color copies of 13 classical paintings along with a questionnaire for recording their 
impressions of each painting. Six of the pictures were calming (Departure of Ulysses from the Land of Feaci by 
Claude Lorraine; Dance Foyer at the Opera by Edgar Degas; The Water Lily Pond by Claude Monet; Poppies, 
near Argenteuil by Claude Monet; Boats at Low Tide by Georges Seurat; and Avenue de l'Opéra: Morning 
Sunshine by Camille Pissaro). Seven were disturbing (Head Surrounded by Sides of Beef by Francis Bacon; The 
Fighter by Egon Schiele; Death and Funeral of Cain by David Alfaro Siqueiros; Judith and Holofernes by 
Artemisia Gentileschi; The Carrying of the Cross by Hieronymus Bosch; Saturn Devouring His Children by 
Francisco Goya; and Echo of a Scream by David Alfaro Siqueiros). 
 
People were instructed to view each painting for as long as they wished, to consider their feelings and 
impressions of the painting, and then to complete the rating scales. Emotional reactions and appraisals were 
measured using 1–7 bipolar Likert scales. The instructions thus attuned people to their emotional and cognitive 
responses, although the ratings scales referred to qualities of the pictures. Two items measured interest 
(interesting-uninteresting and boring-engaging), three items measured pleasantness (enjoyable-unenjoyable, 
cheerful-sad, and pleasing-displeasing), three items measured appraisals of novelty–complexity (familiar-
unfamiliar, simple-complex, and common-unusual), three items measured appraisals of coping potential (easy to 
understand-hard to understand, comprehensible-incomprehensible, and coherent-incoherent), and one item 
measured judgments of the paintings' disturbingness (calming-disturbing). These items have been widely used 
in past experimental research on interest (e.g., Berlyne & Peckham, 1966; Silvia, in press, Sylvia, 2005a,Sylvia, 
2005c), and multivariate studies show that the items form the appropriate factors (e.g., Evans & Day, 1971). 
 
Results  
Analysis Strategy and Data Reduction 
The data have a multilevel structure, in which responses to the 13 paintings are nested within each of 77 people 
(Hox, 2002). Appraisal theories make predictions at the intraindividual level—a person's appraisals cause that 
person's emotions—but appraisal predictions are usually tested at the between-person level (i.e., relations 
between variables at the level of the sample). Instead of collapsing across the within-person information and 
computing conventional multiple regression analyses, we estimated the within-person relationships between 
appraisals and emotions using multilevel random-coefficient modeling. One can view these analyses as 
computing a regression equation 77 times, once for each participant, and then averaging the intercepts and 
slopes to arrive at the average within-person relations between appraisals and emotions (although this is only a 
metaphor for the nature of multilevel estimation; see Hox, 2002; Luke, 2004). The multilevel analyses were 
conducted with HLM 6 using restricted maximum likelihood estimation. Due to likely non-normality in the 
outcome variables, the effects were estimated using standard robust errors (Hox, 2002, p. 200). All within-
person variables were group-mean centered (i.e., at each participant's own mean), and the coefficients were 
modeled as random effects. 
 
As a check on the disturbingness manipulation, we tested whether people rated the six calming pictures as less 
disturbing than the seven disturbing pictures. As expected, the disturbing pictures (M = 5.87, SD = .55) were 
rated as much more disturbing than the calming pictures (M = 2.09, SD = .70), paired-samples t(75) = 35.8, p < 
.001. The two items measuring interest, the three items measuring pleasantness, the three items measuring 
novelty–complexity, and the three items measuring coping potential were averaged to form composite scores. 
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Table 1 displays descriptive statistics.  
 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Within-Person Variables 
 
Replicating Past Research 
To see if the appraisal structure identified in past research (Silvia, 2005b) was replicated, we first assessed 
whether interest was predicted by appraised coping potential and by novelty–complexity. The analyses found 
significant effects for both appraisal components. As expected, both appraised coping potential, B = .205, SE = 
.058, t(76) = 3.54, p < .001, and appraised novelty–complexity predicted interest in the paintings, B = .398, SE 
= .054, t(76) = 7.32, p < .001. These effects nicely replicate past research. 
 
Relating Interest and Pleasantness 
If pleasantness is central to interest, then one would predict that interest and pleasantness would strongly 
correlate. In a second analysis, we assessed whether ratings of pleasantness predicted interest. The two ratings 
were essentially independent, B = .033, SE = .04, t(76) = .83, p < .41. Thus, at the within-person level, a 
person's ratings of pleasantness carried little information about his or her ratings of interest. This suggests that 
pleasantness isn't central to interest. 
 
Are interest and pleasantness predicted by the same appraisals? Given that interest and pleasantness were 
unrelated, it seems unlikely that they have the same appraisal basis. In a third analysis, we assessed whether 
pleasantness was predicted by appraisals of coping potential and novelty–complexity. Coping potential 
significantly predicted pleasantness (B = .17, SE = .042, t(76) = 3.9, p < .001); novelty–complexity had a 
significant negative relationship with pleasantness, B = −.563, SE = .039, t(76) = 14.1, p < .001. This effect 
indicates a dissociation of interest and pleasantness: paintings appraised as high in novelty–complexity were 
more interesting but less pleasant. 
 
Are Disturbing Things Interesting? 
In a final analysis, we examined how ratings of the paintings' disturbingness related to the experience of interest 
and pleasantness. If pleasantness is central to interest, then disturbing paintings should be less interesting. No 
support for this prediction was found. When we assessed whether disturbingness ratings were predicted by 
interest and pleasantness, a strong positive effect for interest (B = .395, SE = .034, t(76) = 11.57, p < .001) and a 
strong negative effect for pleasantness (B = −1.042, SE = .02, t(76) = 51.95, p < .001) appeared. As the 
paintings were appraised as being more disturbing, they were experienced as more interesting but less 
enjoyable. 
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Discussion  
Now that the appraisal approach to emotion is well established (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003), a central task for 
appraisal research is to reconcile differences between appraisal theories. The present research directly tested 
two competing predictions about appraisals and interest: an appraisal structure involving pleasantness and 
attentional activity (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), and an appraisal structure involving novelty–complexity and 
coping potential (Silvia, 2005c, Silvia, 2006). The central difference—whether high pleasantness is necessary 
for interest—was examined in an experiment. The pattern of results clearly shows that pleasantness is not 
necessary for interest. First, pleasantness wasn't significantly related to interest. Second, appraisals of novelty–
complexity had opposite effects on pleasantness and interest. Third, pleasantness and interest had opposite 
relationships with perceptions of disturbingness. Ratings of a painting's disturbingness strongly predicted 
interest but negatively predicted pleasantness—this effect is hard to reconcile with the view that pleasantness is 
central to interest. 
 
In this experiment, we focused solely on the differing predictions made regarding pleasantness. Smith and 
Ellsworth's cumulative body of research on interest found two reliable components: pleasantness and attentional 
activity. Pleasantness is the most salient difference between the models, and the two models of interest agree 
about the role of attentional activity. If attentional activity is construed as akin to novelty (e.g., its labeling as 
attentional activity/novelty in Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), then it can be seen as a part of the family of novelty–
complexity variables. We did not test peripheral components of interest's appraisal structure (e.g., certainty, 
effort). These components didn't systematically replicate across Smith and Ellsworth's three studies, and it 
seemed unnecessary to examine the peripheral appraisal components if little support is found for a central 
component like pleasantness. 
 
The empirical disparities between Smith and Ellsworth's series of experiments and Silvia's series of experiments 
probably stem from methodological differences. All three of Smith and Ellsworth's studies asked participants to 
recall an instance in which they experienced interest or to recall emotions associated with certain appraisals. 
People then rated how they felt at the time and what their appraisals were. The issue of how accurately people 
can remember past emotions and past appraisals is not straightforward, but it is clear that retrospective reports 
of emotions and appraisals may be distorted or reconstructed (Levine, Prohaska, Burgess, Rice, & Laulhere, 
2001; Parkinson, 1995). An emotion like interest, which is relatively transient and low in intensity, may not be 
encoded as deeply as emotions that are more intense. Furthermore, interest doesn't seem to involve appraisals of 
goal congruence or compatibility with standards and social norms (Scherer, 2001), so it may be less memorable 
than emotions that implicate important personal goals. Regardless of the exact nature of the retrospective bias, it 
seems clear that an in vivo test of interest's appraisal structure circumvents many of these problems. 
 
Experimental in vivo methods and retrospective self-report methods represent different points on a breadth–
fidelity dimension (see Silvia, 2005c). Retrospective methods enable researchers to gain a lot of data regarding 
a lot of emotions, but they are less suited for examining the inner workings of a single emotion. These methods 
are thus useful when broad information is desired, such as when researchers test entire appraisal models (Smith 
& Ellsworth, 1985). Experimental methods, in contrast, are poorly suited for exploring a wide range of 
emotions, but they are ideal for examining the dynamics of one or two emotions (e.g., surprise; Scherer, 
Zentner, & Stern, 2004). Replicating an appraisal structure with both methods provides powerful convergent 
evidence. But when the two methods provide different results—as is the case with the two appraisal models of 
interest—it seems reasonable to view the experimental data as more definitive. 
 
Finally, we would like to emphasize the value of directly testing competing appraisal structures. As a class of 
theories, appraisal theories have emerged as a leading explanation for the elicitation and differentiation of 
emotions (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Now that there is little debate over the value of appraisal theories, it is 
time to examine the differences between specific appraisal theories (e.g., Roseman et al., 1990). Evaluating 
competing predictions will accelerate the growth of knowledge about appraisal–emotion relationships. 
 
Footnotes  
1
 Factor analyses showed that the items formed the expected factors. The first factor explained substantial 
variance and the items were appropriately correlated: interest (85% of the variance, r = .70), pleasantness (75% 
of the variance, average r = .62), novelty–complexity (58% of the variance, average r = .36), and coping 
potential (83% of the variance, average r = .76). 
 
2
 One might suggest that participants were using the term interesting casually due to uncertainty over their 
emotional reactions or due to a reluctance to report their true feelings. This possibility seems unlikely. First, the 
measure of interest was a composite of two items (interesting-uninteresting and boring-engaging), one of which 
was reverse-scored. The measure was not merely an endorsement of the adjective interesting, so one would 
need to presume that people also used a low-frequency word like engaging out of uncertainty. Second, these 
items have been extensively used in past research. Past studies (e.g., Evans & Day, 1971) show that self-report 
ratings on these bipolar scales load on the same factor as physiological measures of engagement and behavioral 
measures of interest. Because emotion theories predict that an emotion's experiential component will converge 
with physiological and behavioral components, the pattern strongly suggests that the self-report measures 
capture emotional experience. Finally, the results show that self-reported interest was coherently predicted by 
appraisals at the within-person level. Thus, one would have to assume that variance in an individual person's 
uncertain or evasive use of interest was strongly predicted by rating the picture as disturbing, complex, and 
understandable. 
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